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1. INTRODUCTION
The proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL, 
COM (2011) 635 final) expressly includes an “autonomous” 
interpretation standard. The interpretation method is included 
in three places in the instrument: in the Preamble, Recital 
29, the Regulation itself, Article 11, and in the actual sales 
law, Annex I, Article 4. The term autonomous is used in the 
Preamble and the Annex I. An autonomous interpretation 
standard is considered desirable in legal scholarship for the 
application of international instruments, both in private and 
public international law. The introduction of this standard in 
CESL could therefore be an important advancement for the 
theory and practice of international law. In the following, it will 
be analysed how this interpretation standard can be defined, 
how it has evolved in the context of existing international law 
instruments and what the standard is that CESL legislates.
From the first sales law conventions from the early 1960s to 
the more modern double taxation conventions concluded in 
the 1990s among European countries, this range of multilateral 
and bilateral treaties – and in some cases so-called model 
laws or soft law instruments – show different approaches to 
the question of how they should be applied and interpreted. 
Interpretation standards are included in each international 
instrument while the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) provides a general interpretation standard. The 
VCLT applies to most of the uniform instruments discussed 
below, as they are treaties regardless of the technique applied 
to their subsequent implementation or the legal matters they 
refer to. Some of these treaties regulate public law matters; 
others, unusually, contain rules of substantive private law for 
use in international trade. The question of the addressees of 
these instruments and their objective and purpose therefore 
plays a role and will be discussed below. 
The uniform instruments to be discussed here are therefore 
divided by their subject matter into private and public law, 
and CESL is discussed separately in comparison with those 
two types of international legal instruments. Part I deals with 
private law and some public law issues, while Part II concludes 
the public law discussion and considers the application and 
interpretation rules in CESL.
2. CONTEXT WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW INSTRUMENTS
(1) Private law
There are three important origins of modern uniform 
private law for international trade, displaying two different 
types of interpretation standards.We have to distinguish law 
created under the auspices of the Hague Conference of Private 
International Law, the UNIDROIT Institute in Rome and the 
United Nations, more specifically their trade law division, 
UNCITRAL.
The first relevant legal instrument was created with the 
Uniform Law for International Sales (ULIS) in 1964. This type 
of standard has been followed in the UNIDROIT Principles of 
Commercial Contracts (UPICC) of 2004 and 2010.
A second type of interpretation standard had been 
introduced by the time of the later conventions concluded 
under UNIDROIT in 1988, the so-called Ottawa conventions 
on financial leasing and on factoring. Finally, the 1980 Vienna 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) displays 
elements of both types of interpretation standard.
The standards are composed of two elements – method, 
and interpretation in the narrower sense.
(a) Method
ULIS provides in its Article 17 that:
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Questions concerning matters governed by the present Law which 
are not expressly settled therein shall be settled in conformity 
with the general principles on which the present Law is based.
This interpretation standard goes beyond the strict confines 
of the literal wording of the actual rules of the uniform 
instrument. It introduces the idea that there are “underlying 
principles” which will allow a meaningful resolution of questions 
arising in the course of its application to which no answer is 
immediately obvious. It invites the applying user to spend more 
time and effort on finding a solution to the problem in hand 
using the specific instrument. This interpretation standard 
includes the autonomous method of finding an answer as far 
as possible within the instrument itself. Implicitly, this method 
depends on a further step, that of conceiving the instrument as 
a comprehensive set of rules. 
This latter aspect is not expressly included in Article 17 
ULIS, and nor is it in any of the later uniform instruments. 
Its exclusion has significant consequences for international 
contract law, as can be illustrated by the following example.
Article 17 ULIS features almost identically in Article 1.6 (2) 
of the 2010 UNIDROIT Principles of Commercial Contracts 
(UPICC):
 Issues within the scope of these Principles but not expressly 
settled by them are as far as possible to be settled in accordance 
with their underlying general principles.
Isolated application of rules
At the 1989 UNIDROIT conference in Basel to introduce 
the UPICC, one of the presenting scholars criticised the 
wording of Article 7.2.1, the payment rule, which reads: 
(Performance of monetary obligation) Where a party who is 
obliged to pay money does not do so, the other party may 
require payment.
It was stated that the rule did not include express limitations 
like the immediately following rule on non-monetary 
obligations, Article 7.2.2:
(Performance of non-monetary obligation)
Where a party who owes an obligation other than one to 
pay money does not perform, the other party may require 
performance, unless
(a) performance is impossible in law or in fact;
(b) performance or, where relevant, enforcement is unreasonably 
burdensome or expensive;
(c) the party entitled to performance may reasonably obtain 
performance from another source;
(d) performance is of an exclusively personal character; or
(e) the party entitled to performance does not require 
performance within a reasonable time after it has, or ought to 
have, become aware of the non-performance.
It was then concluded that Article 7.2.1 provided an 
overly rigid right to performance and would therefore not 
be compatible with most European legal systems. The only 
“limitation” found in the UPICC was the mitigation duty 
of Article 7.4.8. (I Schwenzer, “Specific Performance and 
Damages According to the 1994 UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts”, 1 European Journal of Law 
Reform (1998/1999) 289).
This result is only possible when Article 7.2.1 UPICC 
is looked at virtually in total isolation. The author is in the 
company of many domestic European courts who refer to 
uniform instruments in a similar way. An isolated rule is 
selected in order to illustrate or underline a point made in the 
reasons of the domestic judgment, for example to demonstrate 
that good faith is a standard of international trade, or a general 
principle. In the two UK cases referring to the CISG, ProForce 
Recruit Ltd v Rugby Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 69 and The 
Square Mile Partnership Ltd v Fitzmaurice McCall Ltd  [2006] EWCA 
Civ 1690 this is the way to refer to CISG in order to underline 
points about the “parol evidence rule” in the construction of 
contractual terms. 
This technique makes such uniform instruments into a 
“toolbox”, a term often used in the course of the European 
drafting projects in contract law, both the CESL and its 
predecessor, the CFR. It conceives of such instruments as 
a loose collection of rules that are on offer and can be used 
according to taste or opportunity.
The legal background for this “quarry technique” is of 
course the private international law status of the uniform 
law instruments. Under current conflict law in the EU and 
most European states, these instruments cannot be chosen as 
lex contractus, the governing or the proper law of the contract 
at present. In the case of the UK this also applies to CISG. 
In state court litigation, they are therefore used either as 
contractual terms or they are used as far their “persuasive 
force” reaches. Even the CISG is said to be subject to domestic 
mandatory rules despite it being directly applicable to 
international commercial contracts according to its scope (see 
P Mankowski, “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen 
Wirtschaftsverkehrs”, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 
(RIW) (2003). For this reason one aspect of the autonomous 
interpretation method seems to have no firm root in the law 
– the  comprehensive conception of the uniform instrument, 
comparable to any domestic codification.
Comprehensive application of a uniform instrument
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If applied in its context Article 7.2.1 UPICC will yield 
satisfactory results. If the rule was part of a domestic codification 
it would not readily be viewed in isolation. Domestic pieces 
of legislation are not normally viewed as “toolboxes.” Instead, 
lawyers learn over their several years of education how to apply 
codifications. Codifications being mainly assigned to so-called 
civil law jurisdictions, the civil law methods of applying law 
may serve as an example and a starting point. 
As for the application of Article 7.2.1 UPICC, the wording 
shows that the rule does not actually establish the payment 
obligation itself, it presupposes it. In order to establish whether 
the obligee can actually require payment, the obligation would 
have to be valid, mature and enforceable. The first condition 
would have to be found in the contract and if necessary 
established by the rules of the UPICC on formation and validity 
of contracts. If an obligation has arisen according to those tests 
it would have to be asked whether the obligor had any defences 
against the obligation. These could also arise from the contract, 
aided by UPICC rules on mistake, defective goods, frustration, 
hardship or force majeure. Our hierarchy of defences would be 
categorised by the legal category they arise from, beginning with 
contract and then moving on to non-contractual obligations and 
tort (delict). In addition a civil lawyer, or particularly a German 
lawyer, would remark in view of the particular “limitations” 
listed in Article 7.2.2 that most if not all of those are deemed 
never to apply to monetary obligations, certainly in (a) to (d), 
while (e) if applied “analogously” would be expressed by way of 
delay provisions which would include stipulations of interest. 
Article 7.2.2 (e) also represents the condition that a payment 
obligation must be due before it can be claimed and enforced. 
This again would usually be part of the contractual terms. This 
brief outline of an application method can be said to be taken 
directly from domestic law, say in this case German law, and 
brought to the UPICC. It also presupposes an “as if ” status of 
the uniform international instrument, which has been treated 
as if it was a domestic codification, hypothetically using it as 
lex contractus.
So the question now arises whether this exportation 
of domestic methodology is useful and acceptable in an 
international context. 
Application of this technique reveals that Article 7.2.1 
UPICC does not provide an overly rigid right to performance 
and that its drafting is not defective. The rule must be applied 
in the context of the whole set, however, and according to a 
suitable method. Whether this method is an “agreed method”, 
or a common method, or a shared one and as such is part of 
the instrument, is another question. The method may be taken 
from domestic law. It may differ according to the background 
of the applying user. Part of the method however, is contained 
in the interpretation rules of the uniform instrument as well as 
in other international law and ought to be observed. 
Theory of gaps
The aforementioned Article 6 (2) UPICC describes part 
of this method, but excluding, as described above, the part 
which would entail using the instrument in its entirety, as a 
comprehensive set of rules. This latter part, however, seems to 
have found its way into the last sentence of Recital 29 of the 
Preamble of CESL. 
Perhaps the authors of the UPICC and its forerunners and 
related instruments took it for granted that users would regard 
the instruments as comprehensive sets. In any case, Article 6 
(2) UPICC as well as the pendant in ULIS, Article 17, refer 
to a later step in the methodology; the step that needs to be 
taken after all answers taken from the instrument have been 
exhausted. This takes us to the theory of gaps. 
The two instruments state what reference outside the actual 
uniform law should be made at this point, and they point to 
“general principles underlying it.” Neither UPICC nor ULIS 
introduce any other external sources of law to complement 
the law finding exercise further, leaving it open what would be 
the next point of reference if no answer can be derived even 
from those principles. These two rules represent the oldest 
and original approach since the “unification movement” began 
in the second half of the 20th century. 
Later codifications settled on this next step: next in line 
ought to be the law applicable by virtue of private international 
law. Effectively, de lege lata, this means the question should then 
be decided by a national domestic law.
Article 7(2) CISG is identical with Article 4(2) of the 
UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring and Article 
6(2) of the UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial 
Leasing, the so called Ottawa conventions of 1988: 
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention 
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled ... in the 
absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable 
by virtue of the rules of private international law.
This means that no other international law, hard or soft, 
shall be considered in the settlement of the dispute at that 
point, and it should be referred to national law. This is the 
approach taken by the drafters of these conventions concluded 
under the auspices of UNCITRAL and which were then agreed 
upon on the political level in the 1980s.
The last component of the method expressed in these 
uniform instruments is the transition from the uniform 
instrument itself to its underlying principles and subsequently 
the external domestic law. This technique employs the theory 
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of gaps.
All the above-mentioned UNIDROIT conventions 
introduce this step with the wording “Questions concerning 
matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly 
settled in it...”
This choice of words combines aspects of all parts of 
the methodology and also implies an interesting possibility 
of integrating common law approaches to interpretation 
which may prefer to stop short at a more restrictive literal 
understanding of rules of law, rather than applying extended 
interpretation methods as is usual in civil law jurisdictions (see 
the interesting explanation by K Vogel and M Lehner (eds), 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf 
dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen und Vermögen (4th edn ,C H 
Beck, München 2003), 346 about the meaning of the “context” 
element in the interpretation rule of DTCs). It describes the so 
called internal gaps, the lacunae praeter legem.
Franco Ferrari commented on the role of the theory 
of gaps in uniform sales instruments in 1998 following 
the above-mentioned introductory conference in Basel (F 
Ferrari, “Das Verhältnis zwischen den Unidroit-Grundsätzen 
und den allgemeinen Grundsätzen internationaler 
Einheitsprivatrechtskonventionen”, 1 Juristenzeitung (1998) 
9). He sets out that under the established gap theories the 
instruments cannot be complemented by each other. The 
wording of the method articles does not permit recourse to 
a third external uniform instrument, but points the user back 
to national law after having established and exhausted general 
principles, or, more literally, after establishing the absence of 
underlying principles for the problem in hand. This means that 
in the case of questions that may arise in the course of applying 
CISG to an international contractual case, the UPICC cannot 
be consulted to continue the application process. The bridge 
from the first step to the second, ie from the actual text of the 
convention to its underlying principles, is provided by what is 
called the internal gap – a matter falling within the scope of the 
instrument but not expressly settled in it. How to establish a 
gap is subject to theoretical debate in legal scholarship.
Going back to the above-mentioned example of Article 
7.2.1. UPICC, we could ask if this provision represents a gap. 
Professor Schwenzer could have conceived the absence of 
express limitations in the rule to be a gap, not expressly settling 
the question of limitations.  In this case, limitations ought to 
have been sought in the principles on which the UPICC are 
based, which in the event was not done. Whether reference to 
other rules in the actual instruments, according to the above-
described continental jurisprudential exercise, could be seen 
as referring to underlying principles is debatable. It appears 
to be a rather extreme viewpoint.  Ferrari emphasises the role 
of the civil law and common law divide in jurisprudence. He 
points out that continental lawyers are more likely to seek an 
answer within the actual uniform instrument and therefore 
naturally resort to underlying principles, perhaps by analogy 
or teleological deductions, while a common lawyer prefers 
to resort to external sources and assume a gap earlier in the 
application of a body of law due to the preferred closeness to 
the literal wording. 
This means that in applying uniform instruments, the 
lawyer has to be conscious of his or her choices. The uniform 
instruments have in fact been drafted and adopted in the 
awareness and with regard to the different legal traditions 
established by civil and common law traditions. Lawyers can 
use the instrument comprehensively as described above, but 
they may also identify gaps at an earlier stage, leaving out the 
possibility of resorting to the provisions on validity, mistake, 
frustration and hardship in the UPICC to consider the extent 
of the payment obligation in Art. 7.2.1, and seeking the answer 
in underlying principles which again may lead back to these 
rules in order to establish what these principles have to offer.
The UPICC, however, do not suggest reverting back to 
national law by way of applying conflict rules. This distinguishes 
them from the politically adopted UNIDROIT conventions. 
The most extensive politically accepted method is to resort to 
national law after having exhausted answers from the uniform 
instrument itself including all its provisions. This is lex lata as 
embodied in the “Rome I Regulation” ((EC) No 593/2008), 
the Rome Convention (1980 Rome Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations) and relevant case law.
Under the UPICC one could add other possible methods. 
ULIS and the UPICC are drafted after the traditional Hague 
model. They neither include nor exclude the “politically 
correct” method expressly, but they remain open to those 
methods actually employed in international commercial 
arbitration and more progressive legal doctrine. On reaching 
an internal or external gap in a given uniform instrument, and 
after having failed to find a solution in the underlying principles, 
the external norms to be consulted next could be simply those 
of a given forum. Alternatively they could be other international 
uniform instruments or “general principles of international 
commercial law” or those rules that are stipulated to be “the 
law applicable by virtue of the private international law.”
This hierarchy of norms, which itself implies a method 
of law finding, is available as part of general customary and 
written international law (cf J Dalhuisen, “The Operation 
of the Modern Lex Mercatoria: The Hierarchy of Norms”, 
guest blog on Opinio Iuris, April 3, 2012, http://opiniojuris.
org/2012/04/03/the-operation-of-the-moder n-lex-
mercatoria-the-hierarchy-of-norms/ [8 April 2012]. Such 
law is among other sources embodied in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
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Reverting to the actual identification of a gap, we distinguish 
between internal and external gaps, lacunae praeter legem and 
lacunae intra legem. Only the former are dealt with in the uniform 
instruments on private law, there is no provision on how to deal 
with external gaps. Internal gaps, however, receive the same 
treatment in all the above-mentioned uniform instruments. It 
is clear from the foregoing that it depends on the background 
training of a lawyer who applies such instruments at which 
point he or she will actually assume a gap. 
In civil law doctrine, internal gaps can justify analogous 
application of norms. This could then be extended to underlying 
principles. Applying those underlying principles analogously 
may be criticised on the other hand as unduly creating such 
principles. Larenz submitted in his influential treatise on legal 
methodology that an internal gap can only be assumed where 
the legislator had the express objective to regulate a matter 
comprehensively (K Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 
(6th ed, Enzyklopädie der Rechts- und Staatswissenschaft, 
Springer, Berlin etc. 1991), p 371). This is frequently not the 
case with uniform international instruments – often matters 
are left deliberately unaddressed due to a lack of political 
consensus. Typical examples are formation of contracts, 
validity, capacity, and agency. 
German doctrine also maintains that a mere silence on a 
subject within a given codification should not immediately be 
taken as a “gap” but rather all possibilities of interpretation 
of the existing rules should be exhausted, ie the available 
“positive” law should be fully explored. Dealing with a uniform 
international instrument in the above described way “under 
German doctrine” could either be conceived as applying the 
accepted interpretation method of the UNIDROIT and Hague 
Conventions, or it could also be conceived as applying domestic 
law and its values to the international instruments by simply 
looking at them through the eyes of a national lawyer.
In my view this is the decisive question. If the lawyer brings 
his or her interpretation standard to the international table and 
exercises the same diligence in applying the uniform law and 
if he or she is aware of it, then this is an improvement to the 
above described isolated view of the international norm in the 
absence of any method whatsoever. 
Continental lawyers spend their entire legal education 
learning how to the read codifications. It seems that this 
technique mysteriously goes missing when faced with 
international uniform instruments.
The problem to be addressed here is the unjustified 
application of a lesser standard to international uniform 
instruments, both in the areas of private and public law. 
Often, open textured terms or interpretation norms are 
mistaken for conflict rules in order to resort quickly to the 
more familiar territory of domestic law, most often for reasons 
of convenience (see S Gopalan, “Demandeur-centricity in 
transnational commercial law” in M Andenas and C Baasch 
Andersen (eds), Theory and Practice of Harmonization (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2011, p 168). The theory of mandatory laws 
is part of this arsenal of possibilities). An international legal 
doctrine, including the autonomous interpretation method, 
provides a basis to explore international instruments fully so 
that they reveal their full potential to resolve an international 
legal matter which is to be settled by them, be it of a public or 
private nature.
(b) Interpretation
Individual criteria
The interpretation of the individual rules of a uniform 
instrument is regulated in Article 7(1) CISG:
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had 
to its international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith 
in international trade.
ULIS did not contain an interpretation standard, and the 
UNIDROIT (Ottawa) conventions following CISG contain an 
addition to the CISG standard. Article 6(1) of the UNIDROIT 
Convention on International Financial Leasing and Article 4(1) 
of the UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring 
read:
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had 
to its object and purpose as set forth in the preamble, to its 
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in 
its application and the observance of good faith in international 
trade.
Article 1.6 of the UPICC contains a similar rule: 
In the interpretation of these Principles, regard is to be had to 
their international character and to their purposes including 
the need to promote uniformity in their application.
So while CISG sets out the international character of the 
convention, the need to promote uniformity in its application, 
and the observance of good faith as freestanding criteria and 
values, the Ottawa conventions add the “object and purpose” 
of the instrument as a criterion, as do the UPICC which in 
turn consider the need to promote uniformity as part of their 
purpose.
Interestingly, the UPICC, being the latest of the uniform 
contract law instruments developed by UNIDROIT, abstain 
from proclaiming the observance of good faith in international 
trade as an independent interpretation standard.
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It is easy to find reflections of the two original criteria, 
promotion of uniformity and regard to the international 
character of the instrument, in the case law – case law passed 
by domestic courts, collected in a database at the Pace Law 
School and at UNIDROIT. When domestic courts refer 
to those decisions they are promoting uniformity in the 
application of CISG and UPICC. The international character 
of the instruments is observed by developing interpretation 
criteria that suit the special circumstances of international 
trade.
The general standard: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 
1969
The VCLT deals with the interpretation of treaties in Articles 
31-33. Other than the uniform instruments on contract law it 
does not contain a separate rule on method. However, its rules 
contain tools to clarify some of the questions raised above.
The general rule of interpretation is contained in Article 31. 
Its subject is the terms of the treaty. The ordinary meaning of 
these terms “in their context and in the light of the object and 
purpose” of the convention in question is the starting point 
for the interpretation. Therefore interpreting Article 7.2.1 
UPICC in context with other rules of the UPICC in order to 
balance the right to performance seems perfectly justified. The 
addition of the “object and purpose” of the legal instrument 
as a criterion exceeds the guidelines given by both ULIS and 
CISG. Both criteria play an important role in the application of 
international treaties, however, as will be shown below.
The following rules contained in Articles 31(2), 32 and 33 
add a large range of additional materials and procedures to be 
taken into account for the correct establishment of meaning in 
an international convention. Article 31(2) VCLT confirms the 
architecture of most European Regulations and Directives, but 
especially CESL which relies on all elements listed there – a 
preamble, a text and two annexes. The difficulty is of course 
that CESL is meant to be national law and not an international 
instrument (see Part II of this article for further discussion). 
The character of EU secondary law is generally unclear in this 
respect. This is an important factor in the assessment of CESL. 
The answer becomes clearer after looking at the interpretation 
of treaty law with a public law content.
The VCLT confirms the wide ranging method of 
consulting external materials – such as preparatory work, 
the parties’ intentions, subsequent agreement and practices 
for the application of uniform law – and  helps to overcome 
reservations common law jurisdictions might have to such an 
approach. Clearly, this method is justified on an international 
level where negotiations play a greater role than in parliamentary 
debates because the “if ” of the instrument will be much 
more questioned that in a domestic setting with a permanent 
legislator. This is true despite a certain continuity provided 
within a permanent platform like the UN, the WTO or indeed 
the EU. The method opens ways to find tools to establish the 
aforementioned “principles on which the instrument is based” 
by taking a look at the full context of its existence.
Under Article 32 VCLT however, the predominant criterion 
remains the “ordinary meaning in its context” as set out in 
Article 31(1) VCLT.
(ii) Public law
An example of a treaty with a public law subject is the 
double taxation convention (DTC). There are a great number 
of bilateral DTCs concluded among many nations of the 
world. Many of these are modelled after the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital which was first drafted 
in 1992 and has been updated six times since then, most 
recently in 2008.
With regard to the application of these conventions, 
postulations for a “treaty specific” interpretation of their norms 
have been made by practitioners and scholars for decades. The 
biggest obstacle to achieving this is the interpretation standard 
contained in many of the DTCs and most prominently in the 
OECD Model Tax Treaty. More specifically, it is the way in which 
this clause is understood, interpreted and applied, particularly 
in the rather small community of tax law scholarship.
(a) Article 3 of the OECD Model: method or 
interpretation?
Article 3 of this Model is entitled “general definitions.” The 
first paragraph contains a list of definitions of eight individual 
terms such as “person”, “enterprise”, “company” and so 
forth.
Article 3(2) contains the interpretation rule:
As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a 
Contracting State, any term not defined therein shall, unless 
the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has 
at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of 
the taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning under 
the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning 
given to the term under other laws of that State.
This article has not been changed by any of the updates 
and has found its way into most DTCs currently in force in 
identical or similar wording. In the following it will be shown 
how this wording can lead to discrepancies and possible failure 
of the convention.
The rule contained in Article 3 of the Model Tax Convention 
appears in the German-British Double Tax Convention of 
Amicus Curiae       Issue 93     Spring 2013
27
1964 (Convention of 26 November 1964 between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion – DTC D-UK) 
in its Article II:
(3) In the application of the provisions of the present Convention 
by one of the Contracting Parties any term not otherwise defined 
in the present Convention shall, unless the context otherwise 
requires, have the meaning which it has under the laws in force 
in the territory of that Party relating to the taxes which are the 
subject of the present Convention.
This rule not only precedes the current OECD Model but 
also the VCLT of 1969 and, incidentally, the EU membership 
of the UK. It is clearly not compatible with Art 31 VCLT and 
has not been subject to renegotiation in the recent round. 
The rule must be given some credit for originating from an 
era of pioneering work being done on this subject matter 
in the absence of the legal and political infrastructure now 
present in the EU. At the same time this could justify a call for 
reform. The wording of this article, and indeed in comparison 
with the slightly expanded OECD Model article, is far from 
self-explanatory. Why does the application “by one of the 
Contracting Parties” need a special mention? Is it not self-
evident that a treaty will in most cases be applied by one of 
two parties and what is the opposite or the complementary 
situation – the application by both parties simultaneously in 
the same case? 
The default rule in this treaty is that “if the term is not 
otherwise defined” in it and “unless the context otherwise 
requires,” the meaning of that term in national taxation law of 
the applying state prevails. This is not a conflict rule and not a 
method to refer to an external regime upon the encounter of 
a gap in the treaty, but it describes an interpretation standard 
(cf M Schönhaus, Die Behandlung der stillen Gesellschaft im Recht 
der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 
des OECD-Partnership-Reports (Europäische Hochschulschriften, 
Peter Lang, Frankfurt etc 2005), 42).
Article 3 of the Model DTC is often referred to in 
scholarship as the “method article” (Methodenartikel) – see  J 
M Mössner, R Waldburger and M Lang, Die Auslegung von 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen in der Rechtsprechung der 
Höchstgerichte Deutschlands, der Schweiz und Österreichs 
(Schriftenreihe zum internationalen Steuerrecht, Linde Verlag, 
Wien 1998), 433 where he uses the term Methodenstreit , 
dispute about methods to describe different interpretation 
methods. This may be where the expression derives from.
 It is hard to see how Article 3 provides a method 
in the above established sense. It is clearly concerned with 
the terms of the convention and their meaning, hence with 
interpretation. It should therefore be referred to as an 
interpretation rule, Auslegungsregel. Unfortunately, this rule is 
often understood as instructing the user to subject the whole 
case to national law, ie to apply national law if a term is not 
defined in the convention, a method in the above described 
sense, despite the clear limitations through the reference to 
the context and the tax law specific meaning. Current user 
preference in Germany is clearly for the national meaning of 
the term, not for the development of treaty specific meaning 
and interpretation. If applied diligently, it is possible to derive 
an appropriate interpretation standard from this rule, as the 
example of a case in silent partnership set out below will 
show.
(b) Qualification conflicts
This interpretation rule never prevented so-called 
qualification conflicts, where a situation falls into different 
categories defined in the DTC under each of those national 
interpretations and thereby leads to contradictory results and 
double taxation. The accepted and practised solution here is 
not to resolve the conflict arising from the interpretation and 
attempt to reconcile the conflicting meanings, but to refer 
to the provisions about crediting tax paid in one country to 
the dues in the other country, see below. The taxpayer has 
the possibility of referring to the authorities in his country of 
residence (under the DTC D-UK) in order to seek taxation 
in line with treaty provisions by way of the mutual agreement 
procedure as described below. Clearly, this raises questions 
about the relationship of Article II(3) and Article 3(2) of the 
Model with the objectives and purpose of the treaty. It would 
be interesting to ask if the OECD Model DTC has a model 
purpose.
The silent partner in English and German double taxation law
A good example of a qualification conflict is provided by 
the treatment of the silent partnership in English and German 
double taxation law. The silent partnership is dealt with under 
Article VI(4) of the DTC-D-UK:
...; in a case of the Federal Republic the term includes income 
arising from participation in the capital and profits of a company 
resident in the Federal Republic, and the income derived by a 
sleeping partner from his participation as such.
In the Memec case series (Memec Plc v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners [1998] STC 754 (CA); Memec Plc v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners[1996] STC 1336 (Ch D)) a “sleeping partner” in 
a German private limited company (Memec GmbH) claimed a 
deduction of trade tax under UK taxation law in the UK paid in 
Germany by the subsidiaries of the German outfit. The courts 
decided that this was not possible because the income derived 
from this was dividends under the DTC and the partnership 
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with the German GmbH was to be regarded as transparent (in 
Germany) and not giving rise to “business profits” in the sense 
required for the UK Income Tax Act. In Germany however, the 
very same case of Memec plc would have given rise to business 
profits both under the DTC and domestic tax law (albeit not 
necessarily to the desired set-off). Memec plc’s partnership 
agreement was what under German law amounts to a so-called 
“atypical” silent partnership. Those types of participation are 
seen as giving rise to business profits under the prevailing view 
in German scholarship and current case law. 
Interestingly, this fact was not raised by counsel in the Memec 
cases even though it would have made for an argument in favor 
of the claimant’s case. For more detail on this subject see M 
Heidemann and A Knebel, “Double Taxation Treaties: The 
Autonomous Interpretation Method in German and English 
Law; as Demonstrated by the Case of the Silent Partnership”, 
38 Intertax (2010) 136.
The most recent leading case on this subject in Germany 
is from 1999 (Urteil vom 21.7.1999 BStBL (Bundessteuerblatt, 
Federal Tax Bulletin)  II 1999, 812 = FR 1999, 1361 
(Bundesfinanzhof)). The Supreme Tax Court, Bundesfinanzhof 
(BFH) decided a case concerning the German-Swiss DTC. 
A German resident was an atypical silent partner in a Swiss 
enterprise, meaning there was an element of participating not 
only in capital and profits but also in the potential losses of 
the company as well as the “goodwill” and market value of 
the company. This element is classed as “income derived from 
entrepreneurial activity” under the six sources enumerated in 
the German income tax Act (the others being income from 
capital assets, employment, rental and agricultural income, 
income from professional services and “other income”, 
Einkommenssteuergesetz, EStG, section II. 8. (§§13-23)).
The question arises whether it is appropriate to give 
this meaning to the silent partnership under the DTC. The 
argument maintained by mainstream scholarly opinion is that 
the term is not defined in the DTC and therefore Article 3(2) of 
the Model Tax Treaty and the respective articles of the bilateral 
DTCs allow the application of the German interpretation of 
this term, and the classification of these proceeds as business 
profits. Therefore the provision about business profits which 
allocate those to the state in which the business has a permanent 
establishment (PE) after Articles 5 and 7 Model DTC could be 
applied.
In the Swiss case of 1999 the tax authorities themselves 
had taken the opposite view. They argued that the involvement 
of the silent partner in the business was not active enough 
to justify the classification of his income as business profits. 
Their hope was obviously to have them classed as dividends, 
which would have channelled the tax to Germany. There had 
been decisions where it was maintained that the question had 
to be decided by looking at the individual case rather than 
assuming business profits as a matter of course which gave rise 
to this argumentation. In that last decision on the matter from 
1999, the BFH considered a view taken in scholarship that 
the income from the atypical silent partnership must be seen 
as capital gains. Taking the individual contractual agreement 
into account but not any individual involvement of the silent 
partner the judges eventually concluded that under the specific 
German-Swiss tax treaty the assumption of business profits was 
acceptable and they insisted on this traditional rather technical 
view which made the proceeds business profits despite a still 
passive role of the silent partner (BStBL II 1999, 812, 813). 
The entrepreneurship is seen in the mere fact that the silent 
partner participates in the losses as well as the profits and the 
occasional clause in such contracts that the silent partner has 
inspection rights towards the company or indeed only one of 
its partners regarding his share or sub-share. 
This type of involvement is clearly not seen as sufficient 
to make for entrepreneurship under English law and such 
participation is not seen as a partnership – and therefore a 
commercial activity – in the Memec case. It would be classed 
as private asset management. In the Court of Appeal Henry 
LJ in Memec plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1998] STC 754 
stated (at 756):
The position of Plc was that of a purchaser who, for a 
consideration consisting of the contribution of a capital sum 
and an undertaking to contribute to losses of the owner of a 
business up to the amount of the contribution, purchased a 
right to income of a fluctuating amount calculated as a share 
of the annual profits of the business. Neither in English nor in 
Scottish law would that have left Plc a partner with GmbH. 
This is in line with other continental jurisdictions, including 
Switzerland, which traditionally call this arrangement a 
participatory loan, partiarisches Darlehen. They do however tend 
to treat those proceeds in a similar way as the German fiscal 
authorities – sharing the same company law traditions – and a 
clause in the German-Swiss DTC which made the view taken 
by the BFH in the 1999 case convincing. 
The judges however also included a passage pointing out 
that this solution was right for the German Swiss DTC but not 
necessarily for others. This passage is stubbornly overlooked by 
leading scholars and tax authorities in subsequent decisions. So 
far, no other case involving other DTCs, namely the German 
UK DTC, has come before the courts.
Regarding the German-British DTC, this solution leads to 
contradictory results. Memec plc should have paid taxes on 
business profits to the German authorities but seems to have 
paid taxes on dividends to the UK authorities. Or so it ought to 
have been under the respective views of the two judicial bodies. 
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Double taxation would clearly be the consequence. This 
seems to contradict the object and purpose of the convention 
according to its title.
Elements of the interpretation standard in Article II (3)
Article II (3) DTC D-UK and its relative in the Model DTC 
provide the basis to arrive at a treaty specific interpretation if 
intended. The 1999 decision of the BFH clearly respects the 
role of the “context” mentioned in the interpretation standard 
which after all is part of the now binding 1969 VCLT. 
The most enigmatic element of this rule appears to be that 
of the absence of a definition. What shape or form should a 
definition for the purposes of the DTC have? Is the term atypical 
silent partnership defined in the treaty? It is not included 
in the list of definitions in its Article II (1). A strictly literal 
understanding of the notion of definition can therefore lead to 
the conclusion that a definition is missing and that the meaning 
given to the term in the income tax law of the applying state 
is therefore decisive. This rule resembles the method articles 
in the UNIDROIT conventions. The “absence of a definition” 
could be read as corresponding to an internal gap, a “matter 
not expressly settled” by the instrument. However, the article 
does not refer to national law as an external regime, and allows 
a meaning to be derived from national law to a term contained 
in the DTC. It cannot be inferred that heads of taxation should 
be created under this mechanism, or that the case should be 
treated as a domestic case without a cross border element.
The result is highly unsatisfactory for the tax payer. But 
is his position protected by the DTC? To what extent is his 
interest subject to the objectives and purpose of the DTC? The 
avoidance of double taxation is certainly a value that is solely in 
the interest of the tax payer. The intended procedure to resolve 
conflicting practice and understanding of the DTC is the mutual 
agreement procedure under Article XVIII A DTC D-UK. This 
can be invoked by the tax payer, and his or her argument is not 
limited to the avoidance of double taxation, but he or she can 
ask the authorities in the state of his or her residence to check 
if the convention has been properly applied:
(1) Where a resident of one of the territories considers that 
the actions of one or both of the Contracting Parties result 
or will result for him in taxation not in accordance with this 
Convention, he may, notwithstanding the remedies provided by 
the national laws of those territories, present his case to the 
taxation authority of the territory of which he is a resident.
An atypical silent partner of a German business who is 
resident in the UK could therefore refer the question to the 
IRC. This has not been done by any party as yet. 
The wording of Article VIIIA shows that the object and 
purpose of the DTC may extend beyond its title. An application 
of the interpretation rule of both the DTC and the VCLT could 
therefore lead to the following results.
The starting point should be the term used in Art VI DTC 
D-UK, sleeping partner. Even under the German “reading” the 
atypical silent partner is still a silent partner, a sleeping partner. 
His or her profits are classed as dividends in the convention. The 
term may be undefined in the convention but the qualification 
assigned to it is defined in Article II DTC D-UK. Drawing on a 
variation of the term in order to reach a different qualification 
may mean an unauthorised diversion from this rule. The Memec 
cases present an excellent example of establishing an appropriate 
understanding of the term and convincing qualification of the 
proceeds by way of the thorough interpretation of the term 
business profits, or dividend respectively, in the decisions. The 
judges perform an interpretation in three steps. They first 
establish the understanding of an ordinary businessman, then 
the meaning under domestic tax law and finally the meaning 
under the DTC. They put the contractual arrangement between 
the British Memec plc and its German partner GmbH to the 
test under these three aspects. All three of them reveal that 
neither the ordinary businessman, nor the British income tax 
Act (ICTA), nor the DTC would conceive of the proceeds from 
this arrangement as business profits. This is quite contrary to 
the prevailing German practice, but very much in line with 
Article II (3) of the DTC and Art 31 VCLT. 
The first test establishes the ordinary meaning of the term, 
the second puts in in its domestic tax law context as prescribed 
in Article 31 VCLT and in Article II (3) DTC, and the third 
combines the second test with the international aspect. This 
third test is in my view what sets the British decision apart. 
This third test is not expressly prescribed by the VCLT or by 
the DTC, and yet it seems to be the most important step to 
take in an international convention. It is the so-called treaty 
specific interpretation technique. The model for this test can 
be found in the House of Lords decision of Fothergill v Monarch 
Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251. Here, it was established that a term 
can have different meanings in a domestic and an international 
setting. For the purposes of the DTC, it is therefore possible 
to assign a different meaning to the term “business profits” 
or “dividends” from that an ordinary businessman would 
understand from domestic tax law.  To arrive at this meaning, 
the judges in Memec compared German law on the subject and 
concluded that German law considered the arrangement to 
be a “partnership” and therefore “transparent”, so that the 
taxes were raised from the proceeds of the (silent) partner, 
not the body corporate. Other than the German case law, the 
House of Lords decided that those proceeds were not business 
profits, and also denied that the arrangement amounted to 
a “partnership” under English or Scots law, obviously not 
knowing the German take on this question.
It can be queried whether the requirements of the 
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interpretation rule in the VCLT are satisfied by this exercise. 
Certainly, the judges interpreted the term “dividends” in the 
DTC in the context of the international instrument. This 
context included the foreign law, in particular the law of the 
partner state with which the bilateral instrument was concluded. 
It can be said that the German case law does this in so far as it 
is acknowledged that the solution in the 1999 case was derived 
from the specific bilateral treaty with Switzerland and was not 
necessarily universally applicable to all other DTCs. 
The terms to be interpreted in these two cases that only 
indirectly correspond to each other are the “sleeping partner” 
and his proceeds, the “dividends.” The problem is posed by the 
absence of a separate rule for the “atypical sleeping partner” 
and the interpretation rule of Article II (3) DTC D-UK. 
Does the fact that the atypical silent partner is not expressly 
mentioned in the DTC mean that it is not “defined” in the 
DTC and that therefore German law can decide about the 
qualification of the proceeds in a German case if Germany 
applies the DTC according to Article II(3)? A German Federal 
Supreme Tax Court  (Bundesfinanzhof, BFH) decision of 1965 
(BFH of 5 February 1965, VI 338/63U) does in fact deny this. 
It said that the mere silence of the subject is not an indication 
that expanding the meaning or creating a new head is acceptable 
in order to reach the desired result.
With regard to the “sleeping partner” of Article VI(4) of the 
German-British DTC, it is therefore highly questionable if the 
solution developed and confirmed under the German-Swiss 
DTC would be justified under this finding. The argument is in 
line with the above described German doctrine of the theory 
of gaps – the mere silence of the legislator should not be taken 
as a gap unless it is clear that the matter was intentionally left 
unregulated. 
This would mean that Article II(3) DTC D-UK, and with it 
the German domestic tax law interpretation, would only apply if 
the atypical silent partner was deliberately left unmentioned. 
It should be noted that “atypical silent partner” is a term 
of German civil law, and has no specific meaning in taxation 
law.  In order to establish why the atypical silent partner is 
not mentioned in the DTC, recourse can be taken to the 
preparatory materials, according to the VCLT. However, the 
first step under the VCLT is to consider the relevant norms in 
the context with objectives and purpose of the convention. 
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